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In November 2018, the territorial community of New Cale- 
donia will determine whether to become an independent 
state or remain under French sovereignty. With less than one 
year to the vote, there are details yet to be finalised, including 
long-running divisions on who is eligible to vote. This In Brief is 
the first of a three-part series exploring different aspects of the 
referendum process. It examines the historical origins of the 
referendum and the complexities associated with democratic 
self-determination in the New Caledonian context.
New Caledonia, annexed by France on 24 September 
1853, formally remained a colony of France until its integration 
into the republic at the end of the Second World War. French 
citizenship was granted to indigenous subjects in 1946, grad-
ually followed by voting rights. New Caledonia’s integration led 
to France unilaterally removing the territory from the UN List 
of Non-Self-Governing Territories in 1947. Broader reforms 
throughout the short-lived French Union (1946–58) led to New 
Caledonia enjoying significant administrative autonomy from 
Paris. In 1958, 98% of New Caledonia’s eligible voters voted in 
favour of remaining an overseas territory under the new Con-
stitution of the Fifth Republic (JORF 5/10/1958).
However, in a series of reforms during the 1960s, France 
wound back the territorial autonomy enjoyed by New Cale-
donia, despite protests from the dominant multiracial politi-
cal party, the Union Calédonienne (UC) (Caledonian Union). 
Between 1967 and 1972, high nickel prices fuelled a nickel 
boom that saw thousands of migrants arrive in New Caledonia 
from metropolitan France and Wallis and Futuna. The indige-
nous Kanak population declined from 48% in 1963 to 42% in 
1976 of the territorial total (ISEE 2017). More insidiously, the 
French government began to actively pursue migration and 
settlement as a means of reinforcing French sovereignty over 
the territory at a time when neighbouring Melanesian territories 
were preparing for independence and France faced mounting 
criticism for its nuclear testing program in French Polynesia.
Calls for independence began to emerge in the late 
1960s, especially among left-leaning, mostly Kanak, student 
radicals. In 1976, some of these groups formed the Parti 
de libération kanak (Party of Kanak Liberation), while the UC 
soon declared its support for independence. In response, 
many non-indigenous people left the UC, and Jacques Lafleur 
gathered anti-independence voters under the banner of the 
Rassemblement pour la Calédonie dans la République (RPCR) 
(Rally for Caledonia in the Republic). In 1981, some pro-
independence parties formed the Front Indépendantiste (FI) 
(International Front), which, in 1984, was expanded to form 
the Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS) 
(Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front). 
An ensuing dilemma concerned how the Kanak people 
could exercise self-determination and attain independence 
in a territory in which they found themselves a large minority. 
The RPCR and the French government insisted on the univer-
sality of French citizenship and democratic rights, with anti- 
independence parties dominating local political institutions. Not 
only was the Kanak population a demographic minority, but 
the RPCR consistently pointed out that the FLNKS could not 
speak on behalf of all Kanak people since a small but significant 
proportion supported remaining with France. Therefore, loyalist 
political rhetoric often contrasted the supposedly multiracial 
basis of French citizenship with the ethno-nationalism of the 
independence movement that excluded much of the population. 
In July 1983, Socialist minister for the overseas, Georges 
Lemoine, invited the FI, the RPCR and a smaller centrist party 
called the Fédération pour une nouvelle société calédonienne 
(Federation for a New Caledonia Society, to talks at Nain-
ville-les-Roches. At the conclusion of the talks, the French gov-
ernment recognised for the first time the innate and active right 
to independence of the Kanak people, as well as the existence 
of a fait colonial (a colonial reality) in New Caledonia. Further-
more, the French government agreed to a referendum in which 
independence would be one of the options proposed. Howev-
er, the RPCR refused to accept the right to independence for 
a part of the population or the restriction of the right to vote.
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territory’s economic development. Despite being a nationwide 
vote, little more than a third of France’s eligible voters 
participated, reflecting the relative lack of interest in overseas 
affairs among the general public. In New Caledonia, only 57% 
of voters approved the Accords, with substantial numbers on 
both sides sceptical of the arrangement (JORF 10/11/1988). 
Indeed, the compromise made by Tjibaou ultimately cost him 
his life; he was assassinated by a disillusioned FLNKS member 
on 4 May 1989.
The Accords pushed back the referendum on full sover-
eignty to 1998. Eligibility to vote would have been based on 
eligibility for the 1988 referendum — constitutionally referred to 
as the ‘population concerned’.  
However, a referendum never happened in 1998. Instead, 
the Noumea Accord, signed on 5 May 1998, agreed to delay 
it to between 2014 and 2018, motivated by a concern that 
a referendum could marginalise a large minority of the pop-
ulation and spark a repeat of the violence a decade before. 
The Accord stipulated that those with a minimum 20 years’ 
residency as of 31 December 2013 would be eligible to par-
ticipate. As Part 2 will outline, despite the imminence of the 
consultation expected in November 2018, there continues to 
be disagreement on the development of the electoral list.
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Questions remain on how a right to independence could 
translate into a political settlement leading towards full sover-
eignty, and who would be able to participate in a referendum 
of self-determination. Restricting the right to vote to the Kanak, 
or a particular segment of the population, transgressed French 
constitutional precepts concerning the equality of rights of all 
French citizens, including suffrage. 
The FI and the FNSC agreed that the right to self-determi-
nation was reserved for the Kanak people and those termed 
as ‘victims of history’ — the descendants of long-term, non-in-
digenous free settlers, convicts, and indentured labourers (Bar-
bançon 2008). This notion placed an emphasis on a shared 
experience of suffering due to French colonisation, distinguish-
ing between earlier non-indigenous communities, and more 
recent metropolitans (Tjibaou 1996:184). For the FI, sharing 
self-determination with the ‘victims of history’ was a conces-
sion since the 1960 UN Declaration on the Granting of Inde-
pendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples recognised the 
right to self-determination for ‘colonised peoples’. However, 
many non-Kanak flatly rejected the portrayal as victims, while 
calling for their own contributions to the development of New 
Caledonia to be recognised. Regardless, the translation of this 
discussion into a voting rights restriction remained problematic. 
The French government and the RPCR refused to accept the 
FI’s demand for eligibility to be restricted to those with at least 
one parent born in New Caledonia.
During this time, France maintained that decolonisation 
could only occur within the framework of the French Con-
stitution. But the FLNKS successfully lobbied Pacific states, 
including Australia and New Zealand, and eventually gained 
the support of Australia and New Zealand to re-inscribe New 
Caledonia on the UN List of Non-Self-Governing Territories in 
1986, despite French protests. The inscription placed pressure 
on France to respect the self-determination of the Kanak as the 
‘colonised people’, without stipulating independence as the 
sole, possible outcome. 
However, France remained opposed to a referendum on 
independence that excluded some citizens. In 1987, Jacques 
Chirac’s conservative government organised a vote on inde-
pendence with a three-year residency requirement, subse-
quently boycotted by the FLNKS. It took the blood spilt during 
the Ouvéa crisis in April–May 1988 for political leaders to agree 
to a political settlement. 
The Matignon-Oudinot Accords — signed by Jean-Marie 
Tjibaou of the FLNKS and Jacques Lafleur of the RPCR, and 
approved by a national referendum on 6 November 1988 
— put into place a new political-institutional structure that 
focused on the geographical and ethnic rebalancing of the 
